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STORMING THE BASTILLE. DETENTION CONDITIONS, THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY AND THE CASE 
FOR APPROXIMATION IN EU LAW 
 
ABSTRACT 
Over recent years, detention conditions within the European Union (EU) have come under the 
spotlight as an issue of extreme relevance. Concerns about appalling standards of living in places of 
deprivation of liberty have emerged transversally in the area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). 
The risk that poor detention conditions result in inhumane and degrading treatment – prohibited by 
Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU) - has served to limit the operation of 
secondary EU law. This has occurred in the framework of forced movement of persons as between 
member states, and has mainly called into question the level of protection ensured in the state where 
the person will be transferred. This may hold true for both asylum law and mutual recognition in 
criminal matters. While the broader debate on detention conditions has hitherto focused on Article 
4, the impact on the right to liberty under Article 6 CFREU has been somehow underexplored. This 
paper submits that detention conditions must be studied from the perspective of the right to liberty, 
and makes the case for approximation of detention conditions at EU law level.  
 
1. Introduction 
In the collective memory, there are events automatically associated with turning points in 
history: the Normandy landings as the beginning of Western Europe liberation from Nazi occupation; 
the Boston Tea Party as the prologue to the American Revolution; the storming of the bastille as the 
opening act of the French Revolution. Although only few inmates were interned at the bastille on the 
14th of July, the storming of that political prison symbolised the overturning of the ancien – political, 
social, economic and legal - regime. This did not happen by accident.  
Problems related to personal liberty arise from – and are to be discussed against - the broader 
legal and historical context in which they occur. The analysis of those issues comes with a reflection 
on public powers impinging upon individual personality.1 Studying personal liberty from the 
perspective of its deprivation,2 in particular, means examining a situation that is a precondition for 
the potential expression of any other aspects of individual personality. In this sense, personal liberty 
is indeed special: unlike other forms of liberty recognised over the centuries, it has been upheld 
continuously.3 Its uniqueness shines when we look at the apparent similarity of legal formulas that 
have protected it throughout history: namely, the claim not to be arrested sine legale iudicio (or per 
vim, contra legem terrae and the like).4 Another key feature of deprivation of liberty is its connection 
to security concerns. Personal liberty is regularly interfered with by public authorities for the purposes 
of crime control and, more broadly, in relation to the exercise of a polity’s sovereign powers. However, 
deprivation of liberty can be carried out lawfully (ie not arbitrarily) as long as this happens in the cases 
                                                     
1 G Amato, Individuo e autorità nella disciplina della libertà personale (Milano, Giuffré, 1967) 2 onwards. 
2 Detention is used in a general sense, by equating it to deprivation of liberty. The issue of a difference between detention 
strictly understood and arrest is analysed afterwards. See on the topic S Trenchsel and S Summers, Human Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006). 407. 
3 See for instance Article 8 of the Magna Carta, stipulating that ‘No widow shall be compelled to marry, so long as she prefers 
to live without a husband; provided always that she gives security not to marry without our consent, if she holds of us, or 
without the consent of the lord of whom she holds, if she holds of another’. 
4 See Article 39 of the 1215 Magna Carta, which stated that ‘No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled 
or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon him except upon the lawful judgement of his peers 
or the law of the land’. An important step in the crystallisation as a source of law is the Habeas Corpus Act 1679. 
and according to the procedures strictly defined by the law. Any individual is entitled not to be subject 
to – and to challenge – arbitrary forms of deprivation of liberty: this is the right to liberty, the 
cornerstone of any liberal democracy under the rule of law. 
The broad perspective required when approaching deprivation of liberty concerns the legal 
context and the very nature of detention. Attention must be paid to how rules allowing for and 
governing deprivation of liberty are drafted, interpreted and enforced. To this end, detention 
conditions are a key aspect of a polity understanding of personal liberty. Over the years, the Council 
of Europe (CoE) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have played complementary – and 
equally important – roles. On the one hand, the European Prison Rules (EPR) constitute a guide for 
legislators, judges, law enforcement and prison officers in dealing with persons deprived of liberty.5 
The European Committee on the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has fulfilled a pivotal task of watchdog 
over European places of detention. On the other, the ECtHR has significantly relied on the EPR when 
finding Contracting states responsible for violations of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).6 The operative work of the CPT and the case-law of the ECtHR on detention conditions brought 
to the fore the systematic and widespread problem of poor detention conditions in Europe. They have 
done so mainly through the lenses of Article 3 ECHR, which establishes the absolute prohibition of 
inhumane and degrading treatment.7 Not surprisingly, therefore, for long problems of detention 
conditions have remained nearly exclusively in the remit of the CoE broadly understood.8  
Over the last decade, however, living standards in facilities of deprivation of liberty have 
increasingly become an issue for the European Union (EU) in the two main domains of asylum and 
migration law, on the one hand, and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, on the other. These 
areas, constituting the backbone of the EU area of freedom security and justice (AFSJ), share the 
rationale underlying their creation. The creation of the AFSJ by the Amsterdam Treaty – and the 
embryonic forms of member states’ cooperation preceding it – built upon the need to offset the 
drawbacks of the completion of the internal market and the creation of an area of free movement. In 
order to – inter alia - avoid irregular secondary movement within the EU, the Dublin Convention 
established a system of allocation of state responsibility for the examination of asylum claims. Once 
the state responsible has been identified according to the criteria laid down in EU law, the asylum 
seekers – if not already in the state responsible – will be transferred there. In criminal law, the adage 
that cooperation amongst criminals (facilitated by free movement) requires cooperation against 
criminals (amongst member states) has underpinned the creation of a body of measures based on the 
principle of mutual recognition. The first and most prominent of these initiatives – the European Arrest 
Warrant Framework Decision (EAW FD)9 – allows for automatic recognition of an intra-EU arrest 
warrant issued by a judicial authority to another, and subsequent surrender of the person concerned.  
While the two realms are different in many respects, they also present a number of 
commonalities. Firstly, they set up a system of forced transfer within the EU, whose main aim is to 
compensate for drawbacks of free movement: in other words, to make the Union as a borderless area 
                                                     
5 Recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules, accessible 
at https://archive.is/OTDXp 
6 One of the latest major decision is the pilot-judgment Torreggiani and Others v Italy, App. No  43517/09, 08 January 2013. 
7 The provision reads as follows: No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
8 The main publications in the area homes on the system of the Convention and the case-law of the ECtHR. See for example 
Van Zyl Smit D, Snacken S (2009) Principles of European prison law and policy: Penology and human rights. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Snacken S (2011) Prisons en Europe. Pour une pénologie critique et humaniste. Bruxelles: Larcier. 
9 Council Framework Decision (JHA) 584/2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between 
Member States [2002] OJ L190/1. 
sustainable. Secondly, the system rests on the combined operation of dynamic and static rules. The 
former are the ones regulating the forced transfer from one state to the other. Whereas the latter, 
amount to the provisions establishing a level-playing field throughout the EU: asylum procedures and 
reception conditions as far as asylum law is concerned; defence rights and substantive criminal law in 
the case of judicial cooperation. They both feature exceptions capable of limiting their application – 
eg ne bis in idem in the EAW FD – and are founded on the principle of mutual trust, namely the 
presumption that member states comply with fundamental rights. For years, the EU Court of Justice 
(CJEU or the Court) has ruled out the non-application of EU law for (possible) fundamental rights 
violations. In both asylum (N. S.)10 and criminal (Căldăraru)11 law, however, the system of (quasi) 
automatic interstate transfer has been halted by degrading detention conditions in the state to which 
the person would have been transferred. Similarly to the ECtHR’s case-law, the Court has drawn a red 
line when violations of Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU 
or the Charter)12 were at stake. 
Against that background, the debate on detention conditions has been mainly one of 
exceptionalism, understood as revolving around exceptional issues of inhumane and degrading 
treatment. The conceptual and systematic location of detention conditions in EU law has been 
somehow neglected. Such a gap in the scholarship has prevented the construction of a coherent 
approach to relevant questions throughout the different areas where detention conditions can play a 
significant role. The present paper aims to offer a new perspective. Firstly, it places questions of 
detention conditions – and deprivation of liberty broadly – within the broader context of the system 
of forced movement within (and from) the EU. On the basis of that contextualization, it argues for the 
elaboration of a new right to liberty in EU law. Here, the newness lies in understanding detention 
conditions as part and parcel of the established procedures requirement at the basis of the right to 
liberty. Such an approach has significant implications. It puts in the limelight the relevance of ‘ordinary’ 
poor detention conditions beyond the exceptionalism of Article 4 CFREU. It reveals how widespread 
the importance of detention conditions in the operation of EU law can be. It highlights the connection 
between detention conditions and the right to liberty, on the one hand, and the functioning of 
detention centres, on the other. Thirdly, it makes a case for approximation of detention conditions in 
the Union. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 places the topic in the broader context of forced 
movement of persons within the EU. It is shown that the main role for detention conditions in EU law 
is connected to the intra-Union system of transfer of persons, and to the interaction between static 
and dynamic rules on detention. Section 3 explains how detention conditions have become an issue 
for EU law through the case-law of the CJEU on Article 4 CFREU. The landmark N. S. and Căldăraru 
cases are presented, enshrining the principle that the presumption of mutual trust – and therefore 
the transfer of persons which on that presumption is built - can be derogated from only in exceptional 
circumstances. This leads into Sections 4, 5 and 6. The article introduces the understanding of the right 
to liberty adopted here, and focuses on the role for detention conditions as part of the established 
procedures requirement. Thereafter, the two main arguments of the paper unfold and are considered 
                                                     
10 Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N. S. v Secretary of State for the Home Department and M. E. and Others v Refugee 
Applications Commissioner and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform EU:C:2011:865. 
11 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen 
EU:C:2016:198. 
12 On the basis of Article 52 CFREU and the Explanations to the Charter, the two provisions have the same meaning and 
scope.  
jointly with the findings previously exposed. The relevance of detention conditions under Article 6 
CFREU is discussed. It is submitted that poor detentions constitute a breach of an essential aspect of 
the right to liberty and, therefore, can underlie limitations to the inter-state transfer of persons. In the 
light of the foregoing, the article argues that approximation of detention conditions in EU law is 
needed through a systematic interpretation of primary and secondary EU law. 
  
2. Setting the Scene. Detention and Forced Transfer of Persons within the EU 
The AFSJ was notoriously triggered by the need to control the side-effects of the construction of 
the Union as a borderless area.13 This response has had multiple expressions. There is the purely 
external dimension, materialising eg in agreements with third countries and security operations.14 We 
have seen the strengthening of the outer borders of the EU, which encompasses measures such as 
the Schengen Borders Code and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (better known as 
Frontex).15 These measures aim to prevent third-country nationals from irregularly crossing the Union 
frontiers and entering the EU without a valid title. The internal dimension addresses instead situation 
of illegality and irregular secondary movement occurring within the EU territory.  
While detention is not explicitly mentioned as an option in the relevant EU legislation in the 
former scenario,16 deprivation of liberty is an essential tool for ensuring the effectiveness of the 
internal dimension. To this end, three main categories of persons can be detained: asylum-seekers; 
third-country nationals pending removal; suspects or convicted of a crime. Different as these groups 
can be – especially asylum-seekers and criminal offenders – they present structural commonalities.  
In all three cases the EU legislature decided to use detention, the most serious form of 
interference with personal liberty exercised by public powers over an individual. Coercive measures 
have a precise meaning: through them, a polity states a situation of risk posed by a person to a very 
important and usually supra-individual interest. The sections below show that these types of 
detention have a common horizon: namely, the preservation of the Union as a borderless area. Their 
functioning rests on the combined operation of static and dynamic rules. The latter regulate the 
transfer of the person within or outside the EU, whereas the former establish common rules meant 
to facilitate the implementation of Union law. Thereby, the EU sets up a system of forced movement 
with the view to preserving the safe exercise of free movement. The next three sections present 
rationale and details of relevant rules to detention conditions in asylum, immigration and criminal law.  
 
2.1. Asylum and Migration Law 
2.1.1. Policy and Legal Background 
EU asylum and immigration law is part of the broader project of creating an area of freedom, 
security and justice. As is well known, the abolition of internal frontiers was linked from the very start 
                                                     
13 See among many V. Mitsilegas, J. Monar, and W. Rees, The European Union and Internal Security (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003); V. Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, (Oxford ; Portland, OR: Hart Pub, 2009), 5 onwards. 
14 C. Matera, “An External Dimension of the AFSJ? Some reflections on the nature and scope of the externalisation of the 
AFSJ domains” in Fletcher, Herlin-Karnell, Matera, The European Union as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (London: 
Routledge, 2016). 
15 L. Heschl, Protecting the Rights of Refugees Beyond European Borders: Establishing Extraterritorial Legal Responsibilities 
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2018) p. 141 onwards. 
16 The Schengen Border Code regulates entry in the Union by TCNs. The Regulation sets up a system of border surveillance 
to prevent unauthorised border crossing, and to take measures against who has crossed the border illegally (including the 
apprehension of the latter individuals crossing). The use of coercive measures is also envisaged where border guards are 
required to prevent the entry into the Member State concerned by non-EU citizens who are not in compliance with the 
conditions established in the Regulation. Regulation (EC) No 562/2006, Art 13. 
to the strengthening of the Union’s external borders. The embryos of the Union commitment to 
asylum and immigration law materialised shortly after the infamous Commission white paper on the 
completion of the internal market.17 
On the one hand, the Dublin Convention was adopted in 1990, establishing a first system of 
allocation of responsibility on asylum claims amongst (some) Member States. On the other, the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty introduced EU competences in certain areas of justice and home affairs for 
achieving the free movement of persons, including asylum and immigration policy.18  
The Dublin Convention itself was conceived of as a system for resolving ‘conflicts of jurisdiction’ 
over the examination of asylum claims.19 EU asylum and migration law was born with the need to 
compensate for the opening of internal frontiers in mind, and built upon an approach where ‘the 
movement of asylum seekers and legal and illegal immigrants, on the one hand, and of terrorists and 
criminals, on the other, were conceptually blurred as negative consequences of the abolition of 
borders’.20  
Since that first step, many more have been taken in policy and legal terms. The Union now has a 
Common European and Asylum System (CEAS), which aims to establish a common legal framework on 
receptions conditions, procedures of asylum and recognition of the status of refugee. Under Title V 
TFEU, the EU is currently empowered to adopt measures on border checks, asylum and immigration.21 
The objectives of building an area of freedom, security and justice ‘without internal frontiers, and with 
full respect for fundamental rights’22 signals that the two centrepieces, while not incompatible a priori 
at all, do not necessarily overlap. Policy documents confirm the twofold soul of the Union approach, 
with the objective of a high standard of protection going hand in hand with the prevention or 
reduction of irregular secondary movement within the EU, and increase in mutual trust between 
Member States.23 
The Union aims for an efficient and well-managed migration, asylum and border policy, which 
rests on the implementation of the CEAS and the fight against irregular migration. Actions on those 
ambits contemplate measures covering a very broad spectrum of situations, including decisions on 
short and long-term visas to entering alerts in the Schengen Information System on persons not 
allowed to stay in the EU territory or interception operations at the maritime borders of the Union.24  
In that context, a major role is played by the allocation of responsibility over the examination of 
asylum claims and the pursuit of a common return policy.  Administrative detention is key to the EU 
endeavour, and can take place in asylum law and irregular migration management. The former 
scenario sees detention used pending the examination of an asylum claim, determination of the state 
responsible for that purpose, or preparation of the transfer from the state where the asylum-seeker 
is to the state having responsibility. In irregular migration, detention serves to secure the completion 
of return procedures of migrants from a Member State to outside the Union. While governed by 
                                                     
17 For an historical analysis of the path preceding the Dublin Convention and the Maastricht Treaty, see A Hurwitz, The 
Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), 30 onwards. 
18 OJ C191/4, Title VI. 
19 S Peers. EU Justice and Home Affairs Law 1, 295. 
20 A Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, 33. 
21 For an analysis of the institutional framework under the Amsterdam Treaty, see S Peers, ‘From Black Market to 
Constitution: The Development of the Institutional Framework for EC Immigration and Asylum Law’ in S Peers and N Rogers 
(eds), EU Immigration and Asylum Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 19. 
22 EUCO 79/14, 1. 
23 Stockholm Programme, 69. 
24 On the Commission agenda on interoperability of databases for the purposes of migration control, see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0597&from=EN. 
different rationales, the two types of deprivation of liberty are highly interconnected and share key 
features. Once the person is refused asylum, and is given no other qualification to stay in the territory, 
s/he will most probably be subject to EU rules on returns, including those concerning pre-removal 
detention.25  
Detention of TCNs is linked to a system of forced transfer of persons within or outside the EU. The 
right to liberty – which applies regardless of the nature of detention at stake – is primarily concerned 
and comes into play under Article 5(1)(f): the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent 
effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken 
with a view to deportation or extradition. Administrative detention is also a key step to criminalisation 
of migration in Europe: namely, the use of tools typical of criminal law for the purposes of migration 
control.26 
 
2.1.2. The Reception Condition Directive and the Dublin Regulation 
 The Common European Asylum System (CEAS)27 includes two instruments relevant to the 
detention of TCNs pending examination of an asylum claim: Directive 2013/33/EU (or the Reception 
Conditions Directive);28 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (or the Dublin III Regulation).29 The former is a 
‘static’ instrument, as opposed to the ‘dynamic’ nature of the Dublin III Regulation. The Reception 
Conditions Directive aims to establish a level playing field on the treatment of TCNs during 
examination of their asylum claims. Therefore, the Directive presents no significant cross-border 
element. Conversely, the Dublin Regulation is concerned with the allocation of responsibility for the 
examination of the asylum claim on the best-placed Member State.   
 As observed, the Dublin Regulation sets out a system of mutual recognition in that the 
occurrence of one of the Dublin criteria creates a duty for one Member State to take charge of an 
asylum seeker and thus recognize the refusal of another Member State (which transfers the asylum 
seeker in question) to examine the asylum claim.30 As for individual guarantees and detention 
conditions, the Regulation refers to the rules established in Directive 2013/33/EU.  
 The Reception Conditions Directive establishes common standards of living conditions of 
asylum-seekers within the Union. Detention is defined as the ‘confinement of an applicant by a 
Member State within a particular place, where the applicant is deprived of his freedom of 
movement’.31 An applicant cannot be deprived of liberty ‘for the sole reason that he or she is seeking 
international protection’.32 More specifically, the Directive provides that detainees should have 
effective access to the necessary procedural guarantees, such as judicial remedies before a national 
                                                     
25 For an overview on the use of asylum detention and interaction with pre-removal deprivation of liberty, see M Walter-
Franke, ‘Asylum Detention in Europe: State of Play and Ways Forward’ (Jacques Delors Institut, Policy Paper No. 195 (Berlin) 
May 2017). 
26 V Mitsilegas, The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe. Challenges for Human Rights and the Rule of Law (Berlin, 
Springer, 2015), 77 onward. 
27 The CEAS, which consists of the instruments I refer to in this chapter, has been recently recast by a comprehensive reform. 
See on it F Ippolito and S Velluti, ‘The Recast Process of the EU Asylum System: A Balancing Act Between Efficiency and 
Fairness’ Refugee Survey Quarterly  30:3, 24-62.  
28 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the reception 
of applicants for international protection (recast), OJ L 180/96, 29.6.2013. 
29 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged 
in one of the Member States by a TCN or a stateless person (recast), OJ L 180/31, 29.6.2013. 
30 V Mitsilegas, ‘The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: From Automatic Inter-State 
Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual’ (2012) Yearbook of European Law 31:1, 334. 
31 Directive 2013/33, Art 2(1)(h). 
32 Ibid, recital 15. 
judicial authority.33 Member States are required to detain the applicants in specialised detention 
facilities. When Member States have no option but to resort to prison accommodation, the applicants 
must be kept separately from ordinary prisoners. Migrants in detention ‘should be treated with full 
respect for human dignity’.34 As for communication with applicants in detention, only representatives 
of the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (or organisations working on behalf of 
it, upon previous agreement with the Member State concerned), family members, legal advisers and 
persons representing relevant NGOs recognised by the Member State are entitled to access the 
centres in this respect. Access may be limited by national law, on grounds of security, public order or 
administrative management of the detention facility. Applicants must be provided with the 
information regarding the rules operating in the centres and their rights in an understandable 
language. However, Member State may derogate from this obligation in duly justified cases and for a 
reasonable period of time, where detention takes place in a border post or at a transit zone, barring 
the cases established by Article 43 of the Procedures Directive.35 
 
2.1.3. Detention Pending Removal 
Directive 2008/115/EC is the first piece of legislation in immigration adopted under a co-decision 
procedure. The approval of the Directive proved significantly lengthy and cumbersome,36 and the final 
text has been criticised for crystallising Member States’ (bad) practices in EU law.37  
The Directive applies to TCNs staying illegally on the territory of a Member State. Detention must 
be used only when other less coercive measures would not be sufficient to the aim of the Directive, 
which is to prepare the return or to carry out the removal process. The migrants should be located in 
specialist detention facilities, and they should be treated in a humane and dignified manner with 
respect for their fundamental rights.38 As far as detention conditions are concerned, the Directive 
states the obligation to provide detainees with information explaining the rules applied in the facility 
as well as their rights and obligations. However, the Directive stipulates that visits to the centres from 
relevant and competent organisations or bodies may be subject to authorisation.39 Article 16(1) 
provides that migrants in pre-removal detention cannot be accommodated in prison, unless situations 
occur where an exceptionally large number of third-country nationals to be returned places an 
unforeseen heavy burden on the capacity of the detention facilities of a Member State or on its 
administrative or judicial staff.40 The CJEU has upheld the difference between detention pending 
removal and criminal detention. In this sense, a federal state may not derogate the mentioned rule 
because one of its constituent states has no specialised detention facilities, but must ensure that 
accommodation in specialist facilities in other federated states is provided.41 Furthermore, Article 
16(1) cannot be derogated from where the person concerned consents to that.42  
                                                     
33 Ibid, recital 20.  
34 Ibid, recital 18. 
35 Ibid, Art 10. 
36 See, most of all, D Acosta, ‘The Good, The Bad and The Ugly in EU Migration Law: is the European Parliament becoming 
Bad and Ugly?’  (2009) European Journal of Migration and Law 11, 19-39. 
37 ECRE, Information Note on the Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 
on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, July 2009.  
38 Ibid, recitals 16-17. 
39 Ibid, Art 16(4) (emphasis added). 
40 Directive 2008/115, Art 18(1). 
41 Joined Cases C‑473/13 and C‑514/13, Adala Bero v Regierungspräsidium Kassel and Ettayebi Bouzalmate v 
Kreisverwaltung Kleve, EU:C:2014:2095, para 32. 
42 Case C‑474/13 Thi Ly Pham v Stadt Schweinfurt, Amt für Meldewesen und Statistik, EU:C:2014:2096, para 23. 
Two main conclusions may be drawn from the legislation on detention conditions in asylum and 
migration law. Firstly, the Union has not engaged with the establishment of common standards. 
Secondly, there is a strong connection – highlighted by the Return Directive itself - between migrants’ 
rights in detention and functioning of the centres. Given the conceptual affinity between the rules 
applied in the centres and individual rights, the absence of any approximation effort in an area where 
the Union has laid down a EU-wide framework may lead to undesirable results at national level. An 
example in this respect is the Italian legal framework, where the only – extremely vague - rules on the 
system of specialised detention facilities can be found in an executive regulation implementing law on 
foreigners (D. lgs. 286/1998).  
 
2.2. Criminal Law 
Judicial cooperation within the EU is based on the principle of mutual recognition, according 
to which a judicial order issued in a member state against a person suspected or accused of a crime in 
another state, must be recognised by the latter automatically and without further formalities, unless 
grounds for refusal apply.43 By doing so, it means to substitute the previous system of extradition in 
inter-state cooperation in criminal matters,44 with the view to preventing the existence of any 
criminals’ safe heavens within the EU and ensuring the safe exercise of free movement by the Union’s 
citizens and businesses.45 Similarly to asylum law, judicial cooperation rests on the combined 
operation of static and dynamic rules. The latter are laid down in instruments of mutual recognition 
such as the EAW FD, each of them focusing on a specific judicial order and governing the recognition 
of the latter as well as the transfer of the person concerned. Static provisions are meant to foster the 
smooth functioning of judicial cooperation, by establishing a level-playing field as between member 
states.  
Two main groups of static rules can be identified. On the one hand, we have rules 
approximating substantive criminal law. As many instruments of secondary EU law state, the adoption 
of common rules on definition of offences and levels of penalties pursuant to Article 83 TFEU is – inter 
alia – meant to facilitate judicial cooperation and prevent potential offenders from choosing the forum 
where to offend because more convenient.46 The connection to the compensation of the 
opportunities for crime offered by free movement is apparent.47 On the other hand, there are 
instruments aimed to ensure minimum standards of individual safeguards in criminal proceedings and 
EAW procedures. These are, for example, the Directives on the right interpretation and translation, to 
information, and access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and EAW procedures.48 The introduction 
                                                     
43 As well known, the principle was first applied in the context of free movement of goods. See on this K. Armstrong, “Mutual 
Recognition” in C. Barnard and J. Scott (eds), The Law of the Single European Market: Unpacking the Premises (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2002), pp.225–268. 
44 M. Platcha, “Non-Extradition of Nationals: A Never-Ending Story?” (1999) 13 Emory International Law Review 77.  
45 See the 1999 Tampere Programme. 
46 See for example SEC(2011) 1217 final. 
47 This understanding of opportunity as the root of illegal activities lies at the heart of the so-called Rational Choice Theory 
(RCT) of crime, a criminological theory building on economic theory of crime and deterrence-based, utilitarian approaches 
to punishment. See B. Hindess, ‘Rational Choice Theory’ in W. Outhwaite and T. Bottomore, eds., Blackwell Dictionary of 
Twentieth-Century Social Thought (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 542. 
48 Council Directive (EU) No 2010/64 [2010] OJ L280/1; Council Directive (EU) No 2012/13 [2012] OJ L142/1; Council Directive 
(EU) No 2013/48 [2013] OJ L294/1.  
of minimum standards throughout the EU aims to increase mutual trust, which in turn is life-blood of 
judicial cooperation.49 
Four instruments are relevant for the present discussion, namely the FDs on: the EAW, the 
transfer of prisoners (2008/909/JHA),50 probation measures (2008/947/JHA),51 and pre-trial measures 
alternative to detention (2009/829/JHA, or ESO FD).52 The creation of a borderless area increases the 
possibility for persons to be investigated, tried and convicted in member states other than those of 
nationality. The EAW aims to replace extradition procedures with a smoother and swifter system of 
surrender of suspects and convicted persons between judicial authorities. Research has consistently 
shown that judicial authorities are not inclined to grant pre and post-conviction measures alternative 
to the deprivation of liberty to people not residing therein, as they cannot be monitored properly.53 
Furthermore, people convicted to custodial penalties in other Member States might have reduced 
chances of reintegration than they would have in their countries of nationality or residence. For that 
reason, the EU enacted instruments to overcome these problems through a system of mutual 
recognition (free movement) of custodial penalties (FD 909/2008), probation measures (FD 947/2008) 
and pre-trial measures alternative to detention (FD 829/2009).  
Although none of these instruments explicitly refers to detention conditions, the analysis 
below shows that the latter can be highly relevant to the implementation of those measures in two 
ways. Firstly, the FDs – and the EAW in particular - have been long criticised for not featuring possible 
violations of fundamental rights as a ground for refusal of recognition and execution. This has been so 
despite the FDs – Article 1(3) in the case of the EAW FD – provide that they shall not have the effect 
of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights. Secondly, the four FDs entails the intra-EU 
transfer to a state where the person might or will be detained. This is certainly the case for the EAW 
and the FD on the transfer of prisoners. The aim of the FDs on pre and post-conviction measures 
alternative to detention is by definition that of transferring the person to a state where s/he will be 
set at free. However, the instruments provide the possibility for the national authority to turn the 
alternative measure in deprivation of liberty, eg where one of the conditions for its application are 
breached. 
The absence of internal frontiers and fundamental rights protection are two distinct – though 
interrelated – pillars of the Union project. In a sort of autopoietic dynamic, legal integration is meant 
to secure free movement – as exemplified by the EAW FD – and to strengthen the presumption of 
mutual trust. The latter in turn foster and reinforces the process of further legal integration, as shown 
by the procedural rights Directives and their stated objective of facilitating mutual recognition. 
Detention is a key tool to preserving the EU as a borderless area: it deprives potential offenders of the 
choice of forum; it underpins the implementation of a common return policy; it supports the allocation 
of responsibility for asylum-claims and prevents irregular secondary movement within the EU broadly. 
Provisions on deprivation of liberty are disperse in different pockets throughout Union law, and no 
coherent picture of the role for detention conditions can be taken at present.  
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Next section presents the two main episodes concerning detention conditions in EU law. The N. 
S. and Căldăraru judgments show that – both in asylum and criminal law respectively – detention 
conditions have been addressed exclusively from the perspective of Article 4 CFREU. 
 
3. Exceptional Circumstances. Detention Conditions as Degrading and Inhumane 
Treatment 
One of the most controversial passages in Opinion 2/13 concerned the understanding of mutual 
trust.54 The latter was regarded by the CJEU as a general principle of EU law, on the basis of which 
member states must presume they comply with fundamental rights save in exceptional circumstances. 
The case-law of the CJEU before and after the Opinion is consistent with that statement. Two main 
cases of exceptional circumstances are to be mentioned here. 
 The first breakthrough was the N. S. and M. E. judgment,55 revolving around the transfer of 
two asylum-seekers from England and Ireland to Greece under the Dublin II Regulation.56 The Court 
reaffirmed the long-standing principle that, where states exercise discretion left by EU law, they are 
implementing the latter and therefore are bound by the Charter under Article 51 CFREU. The principle 
of mutual trust founding the CEAS implies the presumption that asylum seekers are treated in 
compliance with the Charter. Where the state cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the 
asylum procedure and in the reception conditions in the receiving state would expose the applicant 
to a serious risk of inhumane and degrading treatment, a transfer would be unlawful and make the 
sending state liable under Article 4 CFREU.57  
 Therefore, the transferring state must continue to examine the criteria set out in the Dublin 
Regulation, to establish whether other criteria enable another state – even the transferring state itself 
– to be identified as responsible for the examination of the asylum application. While praised for the 
contribution in terms of fundamental rights protection, the judgment undoubtedly set the bar high: 
overcoming the presumption would require systemic deficiencies in both reception conditions and 
asylum procedures.  
The Căldăraru judgment is a foundation in the interpretation of the EAW. It opened the door 
to halting the operation of the EAW on grounds other than those established in Articles 3 and 4 EAW 
FD, and brings to the fore the relevance of detention conditions to judicial cooperation.  The CJEU had 
to deal with the possibility to refuse the execution of a EAW on the basis of the risk of inhumane 
treatment in the issuing Member States (Romania and Hungary), due to poor detention conditions.58 
The Court accorded Article 1(3) EAW FD a major role for fundamental rights protection. The 
CJEU found that Article 1(3) obliges Member States to respect the prohibition of inhumane and 
degrading treatment, as stated in Article 4 CFREU. This implies that, where the executing judge has 
objective, reliable, specific and properly updated evidence showing that there are deficiencies, which 
may be ‘systemic or generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people, or which may affect 
certain place of detention, with respect to detention conditions in the issuing Member State’, that 
judge must, pursuant to Article 15(2) EAW FD, request that the issuing judge provide supplementary 
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information (emphasis added). The decision on the surrender must be postponed until supplementary 
information is obtained, allowing it to exclude the risk of inhumane treatment. Should that risk not be 
discounted within a reasonable timeframe, the executing judge is to decide whether the surrender 
procedure should be brought to an end. Meanwhile, the person concerned should be held in custody 
only in so far as the duration of the detention is not excessive, on the basis of the requirement of 
proportionality laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter.59  
The Căldăraru judgment could have far-reaching consequences. Firstly, the CJEU established 
a link between Article 1(3) EAW FD and the obligation to respect fundamental rights in relation to the 
execution of a EAW. The Court explicitly provided for to the non-implementation of EU law, in case of 
the risk of a fundamental rights violation. Granted, what was at stake in Căldăraru was the absolute 
prohibition enshrined in Article 4 CFREU. Other fundamental rights can be balanced, as is the case of 
the right to liberty. One could not expect the application of the Căldăraru to test any fundamental 
rights violations. This nonetheless, the Court acknowledged that Article 1(3) EAW FD can give the basis 
for limiting the implementation of mutual recognition. Furthermore, the conditions set out by the 
Court for the request of supplementary information (which may in turn lead to postponement and 
non-execution of the EAW) are not cumulative, as the deficiencies can be systemic or affect certain 
groups of people or places of detention.  
The CJEU has dealt with detention condition only through the lenses of Article 4 CFREU. However, 
it should be recognised that the Luxembourg judges have received no questions on possible 
alternatives legal interpretation of the role for detention conditions in EU law. Next three sections 
reconstruct a more systematic understanding of living standards in detention facilities, beyond (and 
below) the exceptional threshold of inhumane and degrading treatment. The discussion is placed 
within the EU context of inter-state transfer of persons. Firstly, it is submitted that a new approach to 
the right to liberty is needed, where detention conditions are part of the requirement that deprivation 
of liberty be carried out according to the procedures established by law. That framework is thereafter 
applied to the dynamic and static dimension of forced movement within the EU. On the one hand, 
poor detention conditions undermine the essence of the right to liberty and therefore must limit the 
operation of mutual recognition. On the other, a case is made for the approximation in EU law through 
what is hereby called proceduralisation of detention conditions. 
 
4. The Right to Liberty in Europe and Detention Conditions 
The Union has regularly upheld its uniqueness as a legal order, with autonomy being one of 
the key words in the EU’s - and the CJEU’s notably – vocabulary.60 Fundamental expression of this 
endeavour is the Court’s use of the autonomous concept.61 For reasons of uniformity, equality and 
effectiveness of EU law certain concepts require a Union-wide understanding, and their definition 
cannot be left to the national authorities.62 It is hereby submitted that the right to liberty calls for a 
EU-specific interpretation. In this sense, the right to liberty must be placed in the specific context of 
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intra-EU transfer of persons. In line with Article 52(3) CFREU, this research sees the arbitrariness test 
under Article 5 ECHR as the starting point for the elaboration of a right to liberty that goes beyond the 
existing standard of protection provided for in the ECtHR’s and CJEU’s interpretation.   
Article 6 CFREU states that ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of the person’. 
According to the Praesidium’s Explanations to the Charter, Articles 6 CFREU and 5 ECHR have the same 
meaning and scope.63 Under Article 5 ECHR, ‘Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law’. The cases enumerated in Article ECHR is exhaustive, which signals the importance 
of strict rules on detention in systems based on the rule of law. Other than deprivation of liberty of 
minors, or of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts (Article 5(1)(d) and (e) ECHR), the 
following grounds for deprivation of liberty are relevant here: enforcement of a custodial penalty; the 
lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order 
to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; detention on remand; and the lawful 
arrest or detention of a person to prevent him effecting an unauthorised entry into the country or of 
a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition –Article 5(1)(f).  
Article 5(1)(f) ECHR is the reference used by the ECtHR for interpreting and assessing Member 
States’ compliance with the right to liberty in the context of extradition procedures and pre-removal 
detention. This includes cases where asylum-seekers were involved. The test elaborated by the ECtHR 
for verifying that state laws and practices do not result in arbitrary deprivation of liberty – so violating 
Article 5 ECHR – requires for deprivation of liberty to be: carried out in good faith; closely connected 
to the grounds of detention relied on by the executing judicial authority; enforced in appropriate 
places and conditions; and of reasonable length in relation to the purposes pursued. The Strasbourg 
Court does not require that a decision on deprivation of liberty in this context be necessary and 
proportionate, but only that extradition procedures be ongoing and carried out with due diligence.64  
For the purposes of the present paper, two aspects deserve elaboration. Firstly, the 
combination of Articles 6 and 52 CFREU requires that grounds for and procedures of deprivation of 
liberty be drafted, enacted and enforced in an accessible and foreseeable way (legal certainty), and in 
compliance with the principle of proportionality. To ensure proper protection of the right to liberty, 
certainty and proportionality of deprivation of liberty should be tested across a spectrum of situations 
that goes from the legislative adoption of norms authorising detention to enforcement.65 
This assessment concerns EU and Member States’ laws and practices, as the latter are subject 
to the Charter when they act in the scope of the application of EU law. Proportionality is inextricably 
linked to legal certainty. As the CJEU has recently stated in a case on the detention of an asylum-
seeker, the right to liberty protects against arbitrariness through the requirement that detention rest 
on a clear, predictable and accessible legal basis.66 Broadly-worded rules allowing for detention, or 
vague norms establishing procedures for deprivation of liberty may thus result in disproportionate 
(ab)use of force and thus violation of Article 6 CFREU.67  
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Secondly, the ECtHR interpretation features places and conditions of detention as part of the 
arbitrariness test. It is submitted that the specific test on Article 5(1)(f) is the starting point to 
reconsider the very foundations of the right to liberty, applying to all cases of detention: namely, that 
detention condition must be carried out according to the procedures established by law. Detention 
conditions should be part of that requirement. Once the individual has been placed in detention, s/he 
is still being deprived of liberty, and this requires that clear and accessible legal procedures be applied 
to this continuing deprivation.68 Penitentiary rules, and more in general detention conditions, are 
relevant to the right to liberty. Building on that understanding, two main scenarios come legally into 
play. Firstly, situations where living standards fall below the threshold established by the law would 
constitute a violation of the fundamental right to liberty. Secondly, the standards may be difficult to 
identify as they are too vague or not provided at all. This would raise problems in terms of compliance 
with Article 6 as well. To this end, a major role in this regard is played by regulation of facilities of 
deprivation of liberty. If enforcement and detention conditions are part and parcel of the procedures 
established by the law, the quality of rules governing the functioning of detention centres is key. As 
highlighted above, the EU law itself establishes a connection between detention centres and individual 
rights that can be exercised therein. 
In the next two sections, the right to liberty as outlined here is applied to detention conditions in 
the dynamic and static dimensions of intra-EU transfer of persons. 
 
5. The Right to Liberty, Detention Conditions and the Dynamic Dimension. Limiting the 
Operation of Forced Movement 
Detention conditions are key to the forced movement of people within the EU, which in turn 
is based on the combined operation between static and dynamic rules. The establishment of a 
common framework facilitates the recognition (and therefore the transfer) of asylum-related 
decisions and judicial orders. One of the main reasons underlying the interplay between the static and 
dynamic dimension is the centrepiece of the whole AFSJ: the principle of mutual trust and the 
presumption of compliance with fundamental rights by member states, which applies save in 
exceptional circumstances.  
The case-law on intra-EU transfer of persons has brought to the fore poor detention 
conditions as a major issue of inhumane and degrading treatment. That test, however, fails to take 
into consideration those situations that clearly result in a situation of arbitrariness without reaching 
that threshold. We have seen that, by understanding detention conditions as part of the legally 
established procedures requirement, two main relevant cases emerge: standards are established but 
they are inadequate, be it for the source that contained them and/or for they are so generic that 
cannot be used in practice; proper rules exist, but they are not complied with. At present, there is no 
test in EU law – both legislatively and judicially – allowing these scenarios to be addressed. The 
protection limbo experienced by those in detention conditions that are poor enough to be unlawful 
though not sufficiently so to meet Article 4 CFREU requires a specific response.  
The latter lies in the understanding of the right to liberty put forward in the present paper. 
The ECtHR acknowledges detention conditions as a possible signifier of arbitrariness. The requirement 
that deprivation of liberty be carried out according to the procedures established by law means – inter 
alia – that it must be enforced on the basis of clear, foreseeable and accessible rules. The approach to 
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the right to liberty espoused here draws upon the test elaborated by the ECtHR and adjusts it to the 
peculiarities of the EU legal order.  
Living standards in detention facilities must be analysed in the context of intra-EU system of 
forced movement, which knows both a dynamic and static dimension. As to the former, the right to 
liberty is here used to consider whether – and if so, when - the quasi-automatic transfer of persons 
(and the mutual trust presumption on which the system is built) can be limited. The crucial question 
concerns the capacity for the right to liberty to fall under the exceptional circumstances clause and to 
result in non-execution of the transfer of the person concerned - be it under the Dublin Regulation or 
judicial cooperation. It goes without saying that possible violations of the absolute prohibition 
enshrined in Article 4 CFREU constitute exceptional circumstances. The right to liberty, however, is a 
relative one and can be limited.    
The CJEU has recently found in LM that non-execution is an option where possible violations 
of the (relative) right to a fair trial are at stake.69 That finding was stated in the context of the broader 
issue concerning the independence of the judiciary in Poland, the respect by that member state of the 
EU values under Article 2 TEU and the Article 7 TEU procedure activated by the European Commission 
as a reaction thereto.70 In particular, the ruling concerned the risk of violation of the right to an 
independent tribunal, and therefore a breach of the essence of the right to a fair trial. After pointing 
out the key features of judicial independence, the CJEU confirmed the Căldăraru two-step test. Firstly, 
the executing judge must assess, on the basis of material that is objective, reliable, specific and 
properly updated, whether there is a real risk of such a right being breached. Secondly, the judge must 
assess specifically and precisely whether, in the particular circumstances of the case, there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the requested person will run that risk. Furthermore, the 
executing judicial authority must request from the issuing judicial authority any supplementary 
information that it considers necessary for assessing whether there is such a risk. If the risk cannot be 
discounted, the EAW must not be given effect.71 The LM case sets two conditions for the activation of 
the exceptional circumstances clause: the essence of the right must be threatened; the right at stake 
must be connected to the EU values under Article 2 TEU. 
The question as to whether the issues discussed here comply with those two factors comes 
with a reflection on the role for detention conditions in the right to liberty, on the one hand, and on 
the role for the right to liberty in a polity founded on the rule of law, on the other. Detention conditions 
reflect the way in which deprivation of liberty is enforced and the procedures whereby detention is 
carried out. If those conditions are not in line with what the law prescribes, they are in violation of an 
essential requirement of the right to liberty. Likewise, a situation of arbitrariness would occur where 
standards do not live up to the required quality of the law. This might be due – as the Italian provisions 
on pre-removal detention centres show - to the source containing them, or the vacuous wording of 
the rules. While systemic deficiencies can contribute to the evidence of a real risk, the focus should 
be on the specific circumstances of the case – for the purposes of the present discussion, on the 
specific group of people or the particular place of detention.72 The essence of the right is in jeopardy 
where one of its pillars is likely to be violated. This is the case of the independency of the tribunal in 
relation to the right to a fair trial. The same may hold true with regards to detention conditions (as 
part of the established procedures requirement) and the right to liberty.  
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Having shown that unlawful detention conditions (on paper or in action) undermine the 
essence of the right to liberty, the second step requires establishing a connection between the latter 
and Article 2 TEU. The right to liberty is probably the most basic stronghold protecting the individual 
against abuses of the public powers. The statement is not only confirmed by its role and consistent 
understanding throughout the centuries. In this sense, the LM finally revealed that the relative nature 
of a right does not downplay its centrality to the preservation of the rule of law. Though possibly 
subject to limitations, the right to liberty requires the latter being strictly interpreted. Firstly, no 
grounds for detention beyond those laid down in Article 5 ECHR are allowed. Secondly, deprivation of 
liberty is not lawful for the mere fact that it is carried out in one of the cases provided therein. It must 
not be arbitrary, which would happen instead when taking place contrary to procedures established 
by law. Accepting the possibility to operate an intra-EU transfer to a state where the person is likely 
to be placed in unlawful detention conditions would mean tolerating an attack against a centrepiece 
of the rule of law. Turning a blind eye on deprivation of liberty in violation or in the absence of clear 
and legally established procedures is opening the door to the systematic exercise of arbitrary powers 
over the individuals within the EU, which seems hardly compatible with the values enshrined in Article 
2 TEU.   
The reflection on the dynamic expression of detention conditions in the right to liberty and 
the intra-EU transfer of persons must be complemented by steps in its static dimension. This relates 
to the establishment of a level-playing field in the area, similarly to what happened in other realms. 
The following paragraph discusses the very first aspect to be considered in this respect, that is the 
existence of competence for the EU legislature.  
 
6. The Static Dimension and the EU Legislative Competence. The Case for 
Approximation 
The findings emerging from the foregoing discussion allow depict a more systematic and 
conceptually rounded place for detention conditions in EU law. Firstly, detention conditions must be 
part and parcel of the established procedures requirement under the right to liberty. This means that 
deprivation of liberty must be enforced following clear, accessible and foreseeable rules. Secondly, (1) 
detention conditions, (2) rights of the person deprived of liberty and (3) functioning of detention 
centres are inextricably linked. The connection between the first two elements is inherent in the 
understanding of the right to liberty put forward in this article. The conceptual tie between (1) and 
(2), on the one hand, and (3) on the other, is upheld by the very EU law presented above. According 
to the Return Directive, member states are required to systematically provide detainees with 
information explaining the rules applied in the facility and sets out their rights and obligations. The 
rules applied in detention centres logically determine what the conditions therein are. In other words, 
they are just a different angle from which to consider the issue of standards in facilities of deprivation 
of liberty. They are therefore part of the established procedures requirement, and are to comply with 
it. Thirdly, relevant legal rules lacking clarity, accessibility and foreseeability, or conditions that do not 
live up to the standards laid down in the law, result in a situation of arbitrariness and therefore 
undermine the essence of the right to liberty. Fourthly, those scenarios trigger the exceptional 
circumstances clause. This would result in the non-application of the presumption of mutual trust and 
the non-operation of the intra-EU transfer. Endorsing a system where there are substantive, objective 
and reliable evidence to believe that the person will be arbitrarily deprived of liberty would undermine 
one of the strongholds of the rule of law.  
We have seen that detention conditions in EU law become particularly relevant in the context 
of intra-EU transfer of people, in turn based on the interaction between a static and dynamic 
dimension. Last section elaborated on the latter, and outlined possible interpretations concerning the 
execution of forced movement from one state to the other. The following lines deal with the static 
aspect, namely the level-playing field constituted by common standards on detention conditions. EU 
asylum law features broadly-worded provisions on the reception conditions of asylum-seekers, 
whereas no rules at all are laid down as far as irregular migration and criminal law are concerned. This 
research considers the very existence of a legal basis in the Treaties for the establishment of common 
standards in this area. 
The case for approximation of detention conditions in EU law is both principled and functional. 
The right to liberty heavily relies on legal certainty, which materialises in the cases and the procedures 
requirements especially. The (quasi) automatic system of forced movement of persons within the EU 
requires a broader and deeper application of that requirement. Building on the understanding of 
Article 6 CFREU stated here, it is argued that common standards should be established throughout 
the Union for detention conditions are part of a centrepiece of the right to liberty. Bringing detention 
conditions under the umbrella of EU would also entail an additional layer of monitoring, constituted 
by the CJEU’s oversight and the Commission’s power under Article 258 TFEU for compliant member 
states. There are, however, also pragmatic reasons to support action from the EU legislature. The 
procedural rights Directives were explicitly adopted with the view to increasing mutual trust as 
between member states, which in turn is key to fostering the smooth operation of mutual recognition 
– and the intra-EU transfer of persons broadly. The argument stated in the previous paragraph and 
the CJEU’s case-law highlight that flaws in the static dimension can compromise the proper 
functioning of forced movement.  
The relevant articles concerning asylum and migration law are flexible enough to give the 
Union legislature discretion in this area. On the one hand, the EU shall adopt measures comprising 
standards concerning the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum or subsidiary 
protection.73 On the other, rules should be enacted – inter alia – in the area of illegal immigration and 
unauthorised residence, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without 
authorization.74 
Approximation of detention in criminal law is more problematic. A possible objection to an EU 
competence is that the legal basis does not empower the Union to adopt measures in this area. To 
this end, Article 82(1) TFEU refers to the possibility of minimum harmonisation with regard to 
individual rights in criminal procedure. Such a concept should not be used interchangeably with that 
of criminal proceedings. A systematic interpretation rests on the understanding of criminal procedure 
and criminal proceedings as two concentric circles, with the latter being entirely contained in the – 
broader – former one. The procedural rights Directives state the objective of establishing rights in 
criminal proceedings. They define their scope of application as until the final judgment.  
The coincidence between criminal proceedings and final judgment implies a broader scope 
for criminal procedure, which naturally includes enforcement as well. Such a finding must be read in 
combination with the legal basis in EU procedural criminal law as laid down in Article 82(2)(b) TFEU. 
That provision confers upon the EU the power to adopt minimum rules on rights of individuals in 
criminal procedure. As the Treaty refers to individual rights, this article argues for the 
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proceduralisation of detention conditions. By turning upside down the existing perspective, a possible 
Directive should understand those conditions as individual rights rather than as impersonal standards. 
The European Prison Rules should constitute the main source of the EU legislative initiative. Where 
the latter refer to the required characteristics of eg accommodation, hygiene, nutrition, clothing and 
bedding,75 a Directive should lay down those provisions as detainees’ entitlement. This should be 
supported by the inclusion of a system of remedies for their violation. Preparatory work of Article 82 
TFEU. It is true that, on looking at the preparatory work of Article 82 TFEU, that legal basis seems 
meant to cover situations under Article 6 ECHR and not Article 5 ECHR. That objection can be 
overcome by reasons of effectiveness of EU law, first. The establishment of common standards would 
facilitate mutual recognition as required by the legal basis under examination. Secondly, the original 
intention of the Treaty-makers would be adjusted and aligned with the EU-specific understanding of 
the right to liberty proposed here. 
The present argument does not overlook the political and legal difficulties that would emerge, 
such as the definition of the concept of minimum rules, objections about proportionality and 
subsidiarity, or the recourse to the so-called emergency brake under Article 82(3) TFEU. However, the 
foregoing argument aims to establish a first step toward a legal debate concerning approximation of 
detention conditions at EU law level. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Over last years, situations of poor detention conditions throughout the Union have sparked 
complex legal questions. Concerns about fundamental rights protection sit next to dilemmas on the 
limitations to the operation of EU law and the competences of the Union legislature. The scholarship 
has not engaged extensively with the reconstruction of a systematic role for detention conditions in 
EU law, scattered across different bits and pieces of legislation and jurisprudence. This paper has tried 
to contribute an original perspective to the debate, offering a more unitary picture of such a legal 
phenomenon.  
The methodological assumption is that issues of deprivation of liberty must be understood in 
the context of the polity where they take place. As for the Union, this means a legal order built with 
the construction and preservation of a borderless area in mind. As known, that objective has been 
pursued through rules promoting and defending free movement. The latter famously underlie the 
creation of the AFSJ, where compensatory measures have been adopted to compensate for the 
abolition of internal frontiers. Instruments of asylum, migration and criminal law have created a 
system of quasi-automatic intra-EU transfer of persons based on: the interoperation between static 
and dynamic rules; the principle of mutual trust and the relative presumption that member states 
comply with fundamental rights. While detention broadly understood has been conspicuously studied 
as a key tool to those three areas, the potential of detention conditions for the system of intra-EU 
transfer of persons has been underexplored.  
In that context, poor detention conditions are an essential factor to assess when 
implementing forced movement within the EU. The CJEU has considered detention conditions as a 
ground for non-execution exclusively through Article 4 CFREU, as part of the exceptional 
circumstances test stated in Opinion 2/13. This paper has submitted the importance of detention 
conditions under the right to liberty and therefore beyond inhumane treatment. If deprivation of 
liberty shall be carried out according to the procedures established by law, the definition and 
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application of clear legal rules on living standards – including provisions on functioning of centres - 
determine the way in which detention is carried out. Therefore, they must be part of the established 
procedures requirement under Article 6 CFREU.  
The LM ruling clarifies that the exceptionality regards the violation of an essential aspect of a 
right connected to the EU values stated in Article 2 TEU. The procedures requirement of the right to 
liberty can be jeopardised because rules on detention conditions are too vague in content, contained 
in an appropriate source of law or not respected in practice. With a centrepiece of that right in danger 
and the perspective of arbitrary deprivation of liberty, a stronghold of the rule of law would be 
seriously under pressure.  
By building upon the approach to the right to liberty proposed in this research, it is argued 
that approximation of detention conditions in EU law would be one of the possible steps to counter 
the risk. The Directives on individual rights in criminal proceedings show that trust may not only be 
presumed, but must be fed by establishing a level-playing field capable of increasing the existing 
standards of protection. Article 82 TFEU connects the enactment of minimum rules on individual rights 
in criminal procedure to the facilitation of mutual recognition. A systematic interpretation of the legal 
basis and the procedural rights Directives reveals an EU understanding of criminal procedure that goes 
beyond the issue of the final judgment, therefore encompassing enforcement of penalties. Over the 
years, the introduction of common standards has proved to increase mutual trust and therefore foster 
inter-state cooperation. The paper has put forward the proceduralisation of detention conditions, 
with the latter conceived of and drafted as individual rights. While cognisant of the legal and political 
questions following the identification of a proper legal basis, the argument meant to foster a debate 
on a burning issue of EU law still insufficiently addressed. 
 
